Modality effects and the relational dimension in the abstraction of memory schema : a thesis presented in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in Psychology at Massey University by Roache, Margaret Shannon
Copyright is owned by the Author of the thesis.  Permission is given for 
a copy to be downloaded by an individual for the purpose of research and 
private study only.  The thesis may not be reproduced elsewhere without 
the permission of the Author. 
 
MODALITY EFFECTS AND THE RELATIONAL DIMENSION 
IN THE ABSTRACTION OF MEMORY SCHEMA 
A thesis presented in partial fulfilment of the 
requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts 
in Psychology at Massey University. 
Mar gar et Shannon Roache 
1976 
ii . 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
I would like to thank my supervisor, Mr . Kerry Chamberl ain 
for the encouragement , advice and generous allocation of his 
time given throughout this resear ch. I would also like to 
thank Dr. Elisabeth Wells for her assistance with the statistical 
power analysi s , and Professor George Shouksmith for the freedom 
he extended in the choice of topic . 
To the children and teachers of Standard 3 and 4 classes 
at Roslyn School , Palmerston North, whose co- operation made this 
research possible , special thanks are due . 
ACKNOWLEDGEMEN1S 
ABSTRACT 
IN'l'RODUCTION 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
The Bransford and Frank ' s Approach : The Original 
ii. 
vii . 
1 • 
4. 
Experiments and Rel~ted Studies. 4. 
Replications and Critiques: The Role of 
Instructions . 6 . 
The Integration of Extra- Linguistic Inferences. 12. 
The Organization of Stimulus Information. 15. 
The Relational Aspects of Sentence Comprehension 
and Memory. 18. 
Schema Formation : Abstraction from Visual and 
Pictorial Materials. 23. 
THE PRESENT STUDY 32. 
METHOD 35. 
RESULTS 40. 
DISCUSSION 47. 
REFERENCES 57. 
APPENDICES 64 . 
LIST OF TABLES 
TABLE 1 
Means and Standard Deviations for Age and IQ 
Score for Four Groups of Subjects Assigned to 
Each For m of the Test. 
TABLE 2 
Percentage of Total Recognition Responses Given 
38. 
to Each of Four Types of Recognition Item. 40. 
TABLE 3 
Percentage of Total Recognition Responses Given to 
Each of Four Types of Recognition Item for Specific 
Combinations of Monality and Relational Term. 41 . 
TAELE 4 
Proportional Analysis of Cond~tional Probabilities 
for Confidence Judgments . 45 . 
TABLE 5 
Cumulated Proportions of Confidence Judgments Cut 
Off at Five Confidence Levels. 45. 
LIST OF FIGURES 
FIGURE 1 
The Interaction Between Modality and Relational 
Term for A and B Recognition Items. 43. 
FIGURE 2 
Representation of the Interaction Modality X 
Relational Term X Recognition Test for A and 
B Recognition Items . 43. 
APPENDI X A 
Mate r ial s 
APPENDI X B 
APPENDI CES 
Power Analysis for Estimati on of Sampl e Size . 
APPENDIX C 
Frequencies for Recogniti on Responses Gi ven to 
Each of the Four Types of Recognit i on I tem. 
APPENDIX D 
Summary of the Analysis of Variance for ' YES ' 
Responses for Four Recognition Items (ABC D) 
on All Forms of the Recognition Test . 
Summary of the Analysis of Variance for ' YES ' 
Responses for two Recogni tion Items (AB) on 
All Forms of the Recognit i on Test . 
APPENDIX E 
Frequencies for Confi dence Judgments Given at 
Six Confidence Levels for Four Types of 
Recogniti on Item. 
Cwr,ula ted Frequencies of Confidence Judgrnen ts 
Cut Off at Five Confidence Levels . 
APPENDIX F 
Recognition Frequencies for Individual Subjects 
in Each of the Four Forms of the Recognition 
Test. 
64 . 
77. 
78 . 
79 . 
so •. 
8 1 . 
vii. 
ABSTRACT 
This study investigated the nature of memory representations 
constructed from explicit and implied information about two different 
types of relationships between the objects or actors described in a 
set of ordered propositions . The propositions described a situation 
which referred to either an action sequence or to a set of spatial 
relationships and were presented to subjects in two forms, verbal 
and pictorial . Ten year old children were given a recognition 
memory task based on the paradigm used by Br ansford , Barclay and 
Franks (1972) . The results showed that subjects had difficulty in 
distinguishing old recognition items from new situation preserving 
propositions based on inferences derived from the acquisition 
sequence , but readily rejected those new propositions that were not 
consistent with the relationships described in the original premises . 
This was the case when the original premises were presented in either 
verbal or pictorial form, and when the relational term used referred 
to either action sequences or to spatial relationships . An analysis 
of the results for specific combinations of modality and relational 
term showed some variation in the general pattern of responses . The 
construction and integration of inferences into memory representation 
was facilitated when action sequences were presented in the verbal 
modality , and when spatial relationships were portrayed in the 
pictorial modality. Action verbs were found to be particularly 
sensitive to modality effects . 
The concept of ' abstraction ' is discussed in the light of the 
results. It is suggested that this concept is not a unitary one , 
and that research concerned with the abstraction of memory schema 
refers to two different types of abstractive process . The distinction 
between paradigmatic and syntagmatic relationships, originally outlined 
in Sassure ' s (1916 ) study of linguistics, is proposed as a useful way 
to characterise these processes. 
INTRODUCTION 
"We act on meanings , not on uninterpreted perceptions ." 
Chase and Clark (1972, p.226). 
A model of remembering and perceiving requires a consideration 
of the functional and integrative aspects of these processes in order 
to have utility and relevance at the level of ' psychological reality '. 
From the late 1960 1 s there has been a considerable shift in emphasis 
in both memory research and linguistic analysis in this direction. 
For example a growing concern is evidenced in the research literature 
with a more detailed analysis of the constructive processes involved 
i n the formation of cognitive representations f rom verbal and non-
verbal stimuli (Wells, 1973) . 
A central concept emerging from recent studies in these areas 
is that of schema . The notion of schema is not a new idea in 
psychology - the first formal statement of the idea was made by Head 
in 1926 and restated in a modified form by Bar tlett (1932) in his 
influential book Remembering . Bartlett's definition of abstract 
schema as 'what is learned ' was considered as theoretically interesting 
but difficult to operationalise , and somewhat too 'mentalistic ' for the 
behaviourist orientation of experimental psychology at that time . 
Recently , however , there have been attempts , in several different areas 
of psychology, to operationalise the concept so that it could be tested 
experimentally . For example studies on perception and memory for 
visual patterns (Evans, 1967a; Posner and Keele , 1968, 1969, 1970) , 
on the recognition and recall of linguistic information (Barclay, 
1973 ; Bransford and Franks , 1971 , Bransford,Barclay and Franks , 1972) , 
and experimental work on motor skills (Schmidt , 1974) have all been 
based on the concept of schema, or the abstraction and representation 
of patterns or sets of relationships from different types of stimulus 
information. This interest in abstractive, organizational and 
constructive processes suggests that future research will bring the 
fields of language , memory, concept formation and perception into a 
closer relationship with one another. 
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This was proposed by Neisser (1967) who utilized the concept 
of schema in his thesis that perception is not only an active , but 
also a selective process in which some sort of organization is 
present even in the simplest of perceptual tasks. The central 
theme of his book is that •seeing', 1hearing1 and •remembering ' 
are all constructive acts which make more or less use of stimulus 
information. The emphasis is not on the properties of the stimulus 
situation alone , but on the interaction of this with the internal 
environment of the perceiver . As Vernon (1955) pointed out it is 
essential in any analysis of our perceptual reactions , to take into 
account the organized classifications of knowledge about the physical 
and social environment which inform and influence these reactions . 
This view is supported by Pylyshyn (1973) who claims that to refer to 
a cognitive representation from sensory stimulation is to imply that 
sensory events are highly abstracted and interpreted into a finite 
set of concepts and relations in order to be represented; what we 
know about some event or object is therefore equivalent to a finite 
set of descriptive propositions . Attaneave (1974) presents a 
similar view and also suggests that future research into memory 
processes will need to be concerned with a closer analysis of the 
relational aspects of cognitive representations ; research studies 
will need to take account of the fact that objects in the world are 
not simply associated, but that they are associated by particular 
relations . These have quite as much fine structure as objects 
or classes of objects and it is therefore necessary that these 
relations be differentiated one from another . 
A closer analysis of the relational aspects of the abstractive 
process in schema theory may well resolve some of the difficulties 
of this theory as it stands at present . Firstly the concept of 
schema as originall y proposed by Bartlett is perhaps too global to 
be of very great use in experimental psychology ; secondly the concept 
of abstraction as it applies to the theory is in need of more precise 
definition and clarification of its referents . Current experimental 
work based on schema theory reflects both of these difficul ties . 
3. 
The aim of the present study is to examine more closely the 
relational aspect of the abstractive and constructive cognitive 
processes which have been suggested by research relating the 
concept of schema to language and memory processes (Barclay, 1973 ; 
Bransford and Franks, 1971 ; Bransford et al. 1972) , and to 
perception and memory for visual patterns (Evans, 1967b ; Posner 
and Keele , 1968, 1969, 1970) . 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
The Bransford and Franks Approach : The Original 
Experiments and Related Studies 
4. 
The contextual approach to meaning illustrated by the Bransford 
and Franks studies emphasi zes the active construction and integration 
of semantic relationships by the subject. This approach has been 
l abe lled "assimilat ion theory" (Barclay, 1973 ) and r eflects both 
Piaget's idea of mapping new experience onto existing structures i n 
order to understand the meaning and Bar t l ett ' s (1932) account of 
schema formation which emphasizes the constructive nature of perception 
and memory . 
A classic experiment by Sachs (1967) can be seen as an i nfluential 
antecedent of t his approach. Sachs presented subjects with a recog-
nition set of sentences , some of which preserved the form and others 
the meaning of sentences embedded in a previously presented prose 
passage . The results of this experiment indicated that memory for 
the syntactic features of particular sentences decayed rapidl y , whereas 
the semantic content or ' gist ' of a sentence was remembe red very much 
better and for a longer period of time. 
In a seri es of experiments Bransford and Franks (1971 ), Franks 
and Br ansford (1972) , Br ansfo r d Barclay and Franks (1972) , have 
demonstrated that adult subjects, when given a list of sentences , 
integrate meaning relationships into who listic situational descriptions 
and forget syntactic information such as which relat ionships occurred 
in separate sentences . On t he basis of these experimental studies 
the authors contend that the information available in memory is a 
function of the linguistic input and of general extra-linguistic 
information or the subject's knowledge of the world . Sentences are 
not viewed from this approach as information to be remembered but as 
information that subjects can use to construct conceptual descriptions 
of situations. Support for this view has come from several studies, 
among them Anderson and Ortony (1975), Barclay (1973), Flores D'Arcais 
(1974),Kintsch and Monk (1972), Singer and Rosenberg (1973) . 
5. 
In their 1971 experiments Bransford and Franks used as materials 
groups of sentences in an acquisition - recognition paradigm. Four 
complex sentences were constructed each of which represented the 
relations among four simple declarative sentences . Each complex 
sentence was then broken down into its four component simple sentences 
which were recombined in a number of ways . 
The set for each of the four complex sentences consisted of (a) 
the complex sentence (FOUR) ; (b) the four simple sentences of this 
complex sentence (ONES) ; (c) sentences constructed by combining two 
simpl e sentences from the complex sentence (TWOS) ; (d) sentences 
constructed by combining three simple sentences from the complex 
sentence (THREES) . No FOURS were included in the acquisition lists . 
Acquisition sentences from each set consisted of two ONES , two TWOS , 
and two THREES . These sentences were chosen so that they exhausted 
the information contained in the compl ex sentence from which they 
were derived . A five minute break was given after the acquisition 
phase and then the recognition list was presented . Subjects were 
asked to decide , for each sentence , whether they had heard it during 
acquisition or not and to give a confidence rating to their judgment . 
Recognition sentences included sentences actually heard during 
acquisition (OLD sentences) ; sentences not actually heard before 
but consistent with the general ideas expressed in acquisition 
sentences (NEW sentences) ; and sentences not actually heard before 
and not consistent with the general ideas expressed in acquisition 
sentences (NONCASE sentences) . 
I n gener al it was found that subjects could not discriminate 
novel sentences (NEWS) from t hose heard in acquisition (OLDS) 
although there was a slight r ecognition advantage of OLDS over NEWS 
at the level of ONES . Although subjects were very confident in 
their recognition r esponses to novel sentences (NEWS) they were 
equally confident that they had not heard NONCASE sentences befor e . 
Results from this experiment showed that the confidence ratings 
order ed r ecognition sentences as follows: FOURS> THREES> TWOS> 
ONES . This ordering effect has a lso been referred to as a linear 
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effect. These results were interpreted by Bransford and Franks 
as an indication that subjects became less confident of having 
heard particular sentences as a function of the degree to which a 
sentence failed to exhaust all the semantic relations characteristic 
of a complex main idea or situational description. The authors 
further suggest that their results are reliable evidence that 
subjects acquired something more general and abstract than simply 
a list of sentences experienced during acquisition; and that 
their experimental technique provides a means to investigate the 
phenomenon of abstraction in considerable detail . 
Franks and Bransford (1972) replicated their 1971 study 
using sentences based on abstract rather than concrete ideas . 
This replication was indicated by the implications of a research 
study by Begg and Paivio (1969) which had suggested that concrete 
sentences may be stored in memory differently from abstract sentences . 
However results very similar to those of their 1971 experiment were 
obtained by Franks and Bransford. Subjects in general did not 
discriminate novel sentences from those heard in acquisition; the 
highest confidence ratings were given to complex sentences despite 
the fac t that subjects had not previously heard these sentences, 
nor had they heard any sentences as long as these in acquisition. 
These results suggest that there is some similarity in the 
process of constructing memory representations of both concrete 
and abstract ideas communicated by sentences. The phenomena 
demonstrated in these experiments seem clear and are replicable 
(e . g . Singer and Rosenberg, 1973) . The interpretations of 
abstractive and memory processes made by Bransford and Franks on 
the basis of these results have not , however , been without critics . 
Replications and Critiques . The Role of Instructions 
Katz (1973) has argued that the linear effect illustrated in 
these experiments is an artifact of the procedure used and not 
anything central to the study of semantics. He considers that 
7. 
although subjects do attend to semantic meaning and context they 
also attend to linguistic context and structure; and that task 
demands are critical in determining which aspects are central in 
recognition experiments . Despite fairly widespread belief to the 
contrary Bransford and Franks have never denied this point . They 
have explicitl y stated (1971 , p. 349) that the boundary conditions 
fo r the phenomenon of linguistic abstraction require further 
investigation and expli cation and that the effect of instructions 
on this phenomenon is in particular need of additional research. 
Katz used two groups of subjects to replicate Bransford and 
Franks ' (1971) study. The purpose of his experiment was to determine 
whether the Bransford and Franks results could be obtained when non-
semantic criteria are disregarded and recognition is based solely on 
meaning. The experimental conditions for each group differed only 
in terms of the type of instructions given. Subjects under one 
condition were asked to evaluate sentences only according to whether 
they had actually been heard before (Actual Instructions) . Under 
the other condition subjects were asked to rate sentences using 
the criterion of whether they meant exactly the same thing as did those heard 
in acquisition (Meaning Instructions) . Two special classes of test 
sentences were added to the recognition list , 'passives' and ' non- cases ' . 
These were included to check whether the instructions were properly 
understood . ' Passives ' were constructed by using the passive 
grammatical form of complex sentences heard in acquisition and were 
very similar or identical in meaning to their active counterparts . 
' Non- case ' sentences were sentences very similar in form to , but 
incompatible with the meaning of the complete ideas presented in 
the acquisition sentences. 
Results for this experiment showed that subjects gave high 
recognition responses to complex sentences (FOURS) under both 
conditions . In the Actual Instructions condition the linear 
effect obtained was very similar to that shown by Bransford and 
Fr anks . However under the Meaning Instructions condition a large 
number of recognition responses were given to component idea 
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sentences thereby markedly attentuating the linear effect . There 
were no differences between the two groups for ' non- case' sentences . 
Subjects under both conditions were very sure that they had not 
heard ' non- case ' sentences before . This seems to suggest that 
extreme changes of meaning are readily detected by subjects even 
when this aspect of the sentences is not the principal focus of 
their attention. A main effect for instructions was , however, 
obtained for 'passive ' sentences . In the Actual Instructions 
condition ' passives ' were given the lowest rating of all, indicating 
that subjects did attend to structure as well as to meaning. Under 
the Meaning Instructions condition ' passives ' were given the highest 
recognition response indicating that structural differences played 
little or no role in recognition. 
Katz interprets the findings of this experiment as evidence that , 
(1) The linear effect is an artifact of the procedure used and 
not anything central to the study of semantics . 
(2) Reliable and fundamentally different processes operate 
under the two different conditions . 
The first point can be conceded as a valid one on the basis of 
the results of this experiment and the following argument presented 
by Katz . The explanation of the linear effect offered by Bransford 
and Franks (1971) , namely that recognition is a function of the 
number of basic ideas in the integrated idea exhausted by the semantic 
representation of the input, is unrealistic . If true it would mean 
that individuals are literally unable to recognize small components 
(basic ideas) in isolation from the whole . The results from the 
Meaning Instruction condition indicate otherwise . 
Katz has effectively shown that the linear effect is sensitive 
to task demands . However the linear effect is only one aspect of the 
theoretical assumptions made by Bransford and Franks and it is not by 
any means the central issue . The basic concern has been rather to 
demonstrate the occurrence and the nature of abstracti ve and integrative 
processes in deriving conceptual knowledge from linguistic information. 
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The validity of the second point made by Katz above might ther efore 
be questioned on the following basis . Katz has shown that subjects 
gave high recognition responses to complex sentences that they had 
never seen before under both sets of recognition instructions . This 
integrative process cannot, therefore , be considered as an artifact 
of the experimental procedure onl y . His results do not seem to 
provide adequate support for the assumption that 'realiable and 
fundamental l y different processes operate under the two differ ent 
conditions ' • 
Overal l the value of Katz ' experiment has been to underscore a 
point also emphasized by Jenkins (1974) . Recognition phenomena do 
change when the quality of the event experienced by subjects is 
changed. The validity of this point does not , however , diminish 
the evidence in support of the presence of integrating processes in 
recognition memory. Research to date , (e . g . Barclay, 1973 ; Flores 
D' Arcais , 1974 ; Singer and Rosenberg , 1973) seems to suggest that 
the integration of linguistic information is, to some extent, 
dependent on the availabili ty of a global event that makes it 
possible for subjects to discriminate true descriptive sentences 
from false ones even though they may not usually be able to discrim-
inate on the basis of the syntactic form or specific content of 
hi storic sentences . However from the fact that subjects do not 
usually discri minate sentences on the basis of specific syntactic 
information, unless there has been a massive syntactic change as 
there is with passives , it does not follow that they cannot r emember 
these aspects when specifically asked to do so . 
White (1974) has shown t hat subjects do remember specific 
syntactic information when exposed to appropriate experimental 
condi tions . White replicated the procedure used by Bransford and 
Franks (1 971) using as materials sentences composed of both abstract 
and concrete ideas . The abstraction of ideas under an incidental 
l earni ng condition was compared with an intentional condition where 
subjects were expected to remember the particular exempl ar sentences 
for the purpose of later recognition testing . For the incidental 
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learning condition results closely resembled those obtained by 
Bransford and Franks (1 971 , 1972) in that the same linear effect 
FOUR3 > THREES > TWOS > ONES was obtained . Data from the 
intentional l earning condition, however , indicated that OLD THREES 
were recognized significantly more often than the novel FOURS . 
White concludes from this that with a greater emphasis on the 
retention of specific sentences there is a lesser tendency to 
abstract the general idea which integrates the sentences. This 
is a valid point which is given additional support from the results 
obtained in a study by Barclay (1973) . 
However the major theoretical thrust of White's paper is his 
criticism of the interpretation made by Bransford and Franks of the 
phenomenon illustrated under the incidental learning condition; 
that is that subjects could not, in general, discriminate novel 
sentences from those heard in acquisition. In particular the high 
recognition responses given to FOURS was taken as evidence that the 
semantic ideas represented by these complex sentences were abstracted 
from the simpler sentences presented in acquisition. 
White argues that a failure to di s criminate is confused by these 
authors with the process of abstraction whereas the method used does 
not allow reasonable inferences to be made about the occurrence of 
abstraction. He suggests that when there is abstraction there is 
little discrimination and therefore seems to view abstraction as a 
process which can take place independently from the process of dis-
crimination. This contention has some validity if the concept of 
abstraction is taken as a unitary one with sole reference to the 
representation of information at a high level of generality or in 
terms of abstract rather than concrete concepts . However the 
concept of abstraction is a complex one which is surrounded by a 
great deal of ambiguity in its reference to memory research . The 
issue has been further confused by the somewhat cavalier use of the 
term by Bransford and Franks themselves as in the following example . 
11. 
"Subjects acquired something more general or abstract than simply a 
list of sentences 11 ( 1971 , p. 348) . 
Posner (1973) has observed that the term 'abstraction ' is often 
loosely used but can be taken to refer to either, 
(1) The classification of information input at a higher l evel 
of generali ty as in the formation and use of abstract 
concepts (Piaget , 1954; Vygotsky, 1962) . 
or (2) Selection of part of the information input which is either 
generalised or combined with other selected aspects to 
create a new integration (Bartlett , 1932 ; Gibson , 1969 ; 
Neisser , 1967) . 
This use of the term ' abstraction ' is consistent with the theoretical 
assumption that perception and cognition are active processes of 
selection, organization and construction. 
This second definition of abstraction is r eferred to by White 
in his paper and can be taken as related to his argument . White has 
shown that a greater emp~asis on the r etention of specific sentences 
lessens the tendency to abstract the general idea that integrates the 
sentences . Under these conditions sentences are likely to be 
regarded as separate entities and discrimination or perception of 
differences as a process can therefore stand alone . Within the 
context of Posner ' s second definition of abstraction, however , it seems 
reasonable to suggest that the processes of abstraction and integration 
cannot stand alone but necessarily entail the assumption that a prior 
process of discrimination has taken place . White's contention that 
when there is abstraction there is little discrimination does not seem 
applicable within this context for the following reasons . The pheno-
menon illustrated by Bransfor d and Franks (1971 , 1972) where subjects 
integrated separately experienced ideas into wholistic descriptions , 
suggests that these ideas had been previously discriminated from their 
original syntactic context in order to be so integrated. If conceptual 
representations are constructed on the basis of the discrimination of a 
selected aspect of the input (such as ideas) it does seem likely that 
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subjects will fail to discriminate on the basis of other aspects of 
recognition sentences (such as syntactic form) which have not been 
integrated into their conceptual representations. Failure to 
discriminate at t his level, however, does not seem to be a reliable 
indicator that discrimination and abstraction have not taken place 
in constructing the semantic description of the situation that the 
subject does recognize or r ecall. 
The Integration of Extra- Linguistic Inferences 
The criticisms made by Katz and White refer only to the claims 
made by Bransford and Franks on the basis of their earlier experiments 
(Bransford and Franks 1971 , Franks and Bransford 1972) . However in 
these particular experiments the authors did not specifically investi-
gate the construction of wholistic descriptions allowing extra- linguistic 
inferences. Reid (1974) has pointed out that despite fair l y general 
acceptance of the fact that memory for meaning or the ' gist ' of a 
sentence (Fillenbaum, 1966) is better than verbatim memory, the fact 
remains that little progress has been made in determining the reason 
one remembers certain ' gist ' and is unable to r emember other . This 
point can also be made in reference to extra- linguistic inferences 
made in comprehension. Although Sachs in 1967 had suggested that 
we need to find out more about just what kinds of information people 
tend to add in comprehending language very little r esearch attention 
had been given to this question prior t o the Bransford, Barclay and 
Franks (1972) experiments . 
The basic assumption underlying the constructive approach to 
language processing is that the comprehension- memory system is a 
selective one which uses information from the input sentences combined 
with stored lmowledge about the world and contextual constraints such 
as task demands to generate a conceptual representation of the situation 
that is meaningful to the subject . Extra-linguistic inferences con-
tribute to these representations to a variable degree . The occurrence 
of inferred relational and conceptual information in subject 's recall of 
discourse has been noted by Dawes (1966) and Frederiksen (1 975) . 
Bransfor d et al. (1972), in a series of experiments examined the 
hypothesis that certain types of information may facilitate the 
construction of semantic descriptions that contain more information 
than is explicitly stated in the acquisition sentences . 
Experiment III i s selected from thi s series as a prototype 
of the approach used . Two groups of subjects were given the 
acquisition task of listening to a number of descriptive passages 
like the following. 
"There is a tree with a box beside it and a chair is on 
top of the box . The box i s to the right of the tree . 
The tree is green and extremel y tall. 11 ( 1 972 , p . 201 ) . 
Following acquisition subjects were presented with one of two 
recognition sets and asked to indicate which sentences from each 
block they had actually heard before . The first recognition set, 
(Set A) contained sentences t hat were in t he acquisition passages 
(OLDS) and sentences that were not (NEWS) . Some of the NEWS were 
consistent with the overall situational description presented in 
acquisition, (e . g . the chair is to the right of the tree) and some 
of them were not (e . g . The chair is to the left of t he tree) . The 
recognition set for this example was . 
Set A 
A. The 
B. The 
c. The 
D. The 
box i s to the right of the tree . 
chair is to the right of the t re e . 
box is to the left of the tree . 
chair is to the left of the tree. 
OLD 
NEW 
NEW 
NEW 
Bransford et al . r easoned that ac cording to t he constructive 
approach subjects would be likely to remember something about the 
particular style, but given that they should forget this,they 
should not be reduced to total guessing . Instead they should pick 
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sentences consistent with the overall situational description even if 
such sentences were not heard in acquisition. They predicted that 
for Recognition Set A subjects would be ve ry likely to pick sentences 
based on situation-preserving inferences such as sentence B above . 
14 . 
A second recogni tion list was constructed based on the fact that 
there are a number of linguistically different ways to describe the 
same basic situation. Recognition Set B was identical to Set A 
except that the subject and object nouns were reversed as well as the 
relational terms . Although there were no sentences that were actually 
OLD for this set , sentences such as A below were referred to as OLD 
since they preserved the semantic relations between objects referred to 
in the acquisition passage . 
A. The tree is to the left of t~ box. OLD 
B. The tree is to the left of the chair . NEW 
C. The tree is to the right of the box. NEW 
D. The tree is to t~ right of the chair. NEW 
For this recognition set the authors hypothesised that if 
recognition is primarily a function of syntactic information subjects 
should be very confused by these items . If , however , recognition can be 
based on an abstracted semantic description of the situation then subjects 
should show a strong tendency to make ' situation-preserving ' errors and 
judge sentences A and Bas OLDS more often than sentences C and D. 
The results from this experiment supported the predictions gene rated 
from the constructive approach. For both groups situation- preserving 
responses accounted for 7Cffo of the total recognition responses made . 
For Recognition Set A the greatest number of recog~tion responses were 
given to OLD sentences indicating some tendency to remember the linguistic 
form in which the information was originally presented . However there 
was also a significant tendency to pick situation- preserving NEW sentences 
based on :inferenresderived from the overall description heard in acquisi-
tion (such as sentence B) in preference to situation- distorting sentences 
(such as sentences C and D) . 
For Recognition Set Bin which no sentences were actually identical 
to those previously heard, there was no significant differences between 
recognition responses for OLD sentences, and NEW sentences based on 
situation- preserving inferences (Sentences A and Bin Recognition Set B) 
despite the fact that the OLD sentences preserved the conjunction of the 
1 5. 
the content nouns heard in acquisition sentences while NEW inferences 
did not . However there was a significant tendency to pick situation 
preserving NEW sentences in preference to situation distorting NEW sent-
ences (such as sentences C and D) . Bransford et al . have suggested 
that these data provide especially strong evidence for the constructive 
approach to sentence memory . If subjects were simply storing informa-
tion as to which objects were related to others in the acquisition 
sentences they should have been very confused by Recognition Set Band 
should therefore have picked many situation- distorting sentences . 
However the 7Cf!o recognition response given to situation-preserving 
sentences does not support t his expectation. 
Bransford et al . in their evaluation of this series of experiments, 
have emphasized that the role of context in the comprehension and recall 
of linguistic information refers to more than the information input from 
the external environment . The internal environment, or the subject ' s 
knowledge of the world is also an essential component of t hese proce sses . 
Linguistic theories which restrict t he charact erisation of comprehension-
memory processes to an analysis of syntax a nd semantics a s do t hose of 
Katz and Fodor (1963) and Clark and Clark (1968 ) do not t her ef ore s eem 
adequate as explanatory models of t hese processes. The const ructive 
approach can be seen as an attempt to overcome these limitations. 
The Organization of Stimulus Information 
Research to date (Barclay, 1973; Green, 1975; Rosenberg and 
Jarvella, 1970) has suggested that a prerequisite for the generation 
and integration of inferences is the condition that the stimulus 
information is organized to outline some overall description of an 
obj ect or a situation. The inference process fills in or assimilates 
extra-linguistic information to the general outline of the situation 
that the subject has in mind. 
Some evidence for this contention is provided by a study made by 
Rosenberg and Jarvella (1970). Noise was introduced as a variable in 
an incidental learning experiment utilizing two types of sentences, 
semantically well integrated sentences (sentences which conveyed a 
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coherent and meaningful description) and semantically poorly integrated 
sentences . When a portion of the acquisition sentences was masked by 
noise to a degree that the masked portion was unintelligible , subjects 
showed an i ncreased tendency to generate and integrate extra- linguistic 
inferences over acquisition conditions where sentences were not masked 
in this way. This effect was limited, however, to sentences presented 
in acquisition in a semantically well integrated form . Subjects were 
not able to generate and integrate inferences for those sentences which 
were semantically poorly integrated. 
Barclay (1973) ran a series of experiments designed primarily to 
investigate t he role of logical operations (e.g. transitive operations 
involving spatial terms such as left- right and comparative terms such 
as taller- shorter) in the construction of memory representations . In 
each of these experiments a structured arr ay of objects was described 
in acquisition in piecemeal fashion by a list of semantically related 
sentences . The list of sentences embodied both expressed and implied 
information. This implied information had to be inferred in order to 
correctly construct a representat ion of the overall array . The most 
general finding from these experiments was that in both recognition and 
recall tasks,subjects not only remembered previously presented sentences 
but also implied but unstated inferences; they drew a sharp line only 
between true and false sentences , thinking that they were distinguishing 
old sentences from new ones . 
In one of the five experiments in t his series, however , two 
different sets of instructions were given to two groups of subjects . 
Those subjects who were informed that the acquisition sentences described 
an overall array did not discriminate old sentences from new ones , but 
were able to correctly recognize the array in 82% of cases. Those 
subjects who were not informed of the existence of an overall array, but 
who were asked only to memorize the sentences, tended to treat the 
acquisition sentences as discrete linguistic entities and thus were 
better able to distinguish new sentences from old ones . However this 
group of subjects was able to recognize the overall array in only 1o% 
of cases . 
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This finding provides further substance to the points raised by 
Katz (1973) and White (1974) which were discussed in an earlier 
section . Task demands are a critical variable in determining what 
kinds of memory representations subjects do construct . However the 
tendency to treat a sentence mainly or only as a linguistic object seems 
usually to be confined to situations where subjects are specifically 
instructed to do this. 
In summarizing his 1973 paper Barclay outlines the basic assump-
tions of the constructive approach (or assimilation theory) which is 
common to the research studies outlined in t his and previous sections . 
He states, 
"The fundamental component of assimilation t heory is t he 
comprehension device which relates sentential information 
to one's knowledge system, in part t hrough logical operations. 
In this respect sentence comprehension is simply one manifest-
ation of the general process referred to as knowledge 
acquisition. (1973 , p.253) ." 
This view, although intuitively satis fying and supported to some degree 
by the experimental work outlined, is in essence general and diffuse 
and leaves open a number of important issues. 
are noted here. 
Two of these issues 
Clark (1973) has pointed out t he fallacy (Language - as - Fixed -
Effect - Fallacy) of trying to draw scientific conclusions from studies 
of verbal behaviour if the effects demonstrated are restricted to the 
specific language materials used in the experiment . The previously 
outlined studies by Bransford et al. (1972) and Barclay (1973) examined 
the role of extra-linguistic inferences in sentence memory only in terms 
of inferences made on the basis of logical operations and spatial 
relationships. In the light of Clark's statement it seems necessary, 
therefore, to ask the following question. To what extent does the 
relational nature of the stimulus information presented constrain the 
range and types of inferences generated by subjects? 
A further question related to these studies arises from Barclay 's 
outline of assimilation theory quoted earlier, and is based on the claim 
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that within the context of assimilation theory sentence memory is 
simply one manifestation of a more general process of knowledge 
acquisition . If the process of inference generation and integration 
is a general process then can it be shown to operate if stimulus 
information is presented in other forms, for example in pictorial 
rather than in verbal form? 
Experimental studies and theoretical views relating to each of 
these questions will be r eviewed in the following sections. 
The Relational Aspects of Sentence Comprehension and Memory 
Data from the preceding experimental studies suggests that peoples' 
internal memory representations of sentences often cont a i n elements 
which could not be derived solely from the constituent words. Anderson 
and Ortony (1975) have pointed out that there are onl y two possible 
sources of this information : context and existing knowledge . In 
order to evaluate t he relationships that hold among t he fea tures from 
which meaning is extracted i t seems necessary to work within some kind 
of conceptual framework. Craik and Lockhart (1972) have proposed a 
model which seems to have utility for t his purpose. This model 
suggests that t he extraction of meaning is related to varying depths 
of processing and reflects the influence of theoris ts from the fields 
of perception (Neisser, 1967) and linguistics (Lamb, 1966 ). The central 
contention of all of these models is t hat the perception of stimuli 
involves a number of levels or stages . Physical or sensory features 
are analysed in the preliminary stages, but later stages involve the 
interpretation and organization of input in terms of a conceptual 
representation which is based on prior learning and experience . The 
application of the model proposed by Craik and Lockhart to memory 
research indicates a shift away from a strongly linguistic orientation 
t o an emphasis on perceptual events and their relation to the language 
structure . Some support for this view is given by Craik (1973) . He 
reports several experiments in which depth of processing was varied by 
requiring subjects to perform different tasks on single word acquisition 
items ; for example either judging whether the word was in capital 
letters or whether i t fitted into the context of a given sentence . 
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The more semantic tasks were presumed t o involve a deeper processing 
level,and it was found that these tasks took subjects a longer time 
than did tasks related to the physical features of the acquisition 
words . Memory over a time delay was also found to be better for those 
items on which the deeper processi ng task had been performed . A 
number of r ecent experimental studies of memory processes have also 
been based on this t heoretical approach, among them Clark, Carpenter 
and Just (1973) and Anderson and Ortony (1975) . 
A further contribution to the clarification of the relational 
aspects of sentence comprehension and memory has been given by Reid 
(1974) who has pr oposed that a sentence is r epresented at the con-
ceptual level in terms of the structure of the various relational 
roles connected with key wor ds in t he sentence . Constraints on t he 
use of language at the psychological level r efl ect two different kinds 
of r elationships - par adigmatic and syntagmatic relations . These terms 
have had a long history in the study of linguistics (Sassure , 1916/1959) 
and have been reintroduced into the study of language behaviour mainly 
through the i nfluence of Jakobson ' s clinical work in aphasia (Jakobson 
and Halle , 1971) . Similarity or paradigmatic relations refer to the 
shared conceptual features that characterise a given pa radigmatic set ; 
these relations are important i n experimental tasks that require 
subjects to detect the presence or absence of features in stimuli and 
also in classification tasks . Contiguity or syntagmatic r e lations , 
on the other hand, are not based on similarity or difference of features 
but r efer to the r elationships that hold between the features of a 
represented situation or event . These relations are important in tasks 
that require a subject to remember some event or situation in terms of 
the r elationships that hold between objects or actors participating in it . 
Statements invol ving systagmatic relations can be further distin-
gui shed as falling into two br oad categories ; statements describing the 
spatial relationships between objects and those which describe one object 
acting upon another. Accor ding to Huttenlocher (Huttenlocher, Eisenberg 
and Strauss , 1968) these two types of relational statements differ in the 
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following way. Statements describing spatial relationships merely 
indicate the order of items along some dimension (such as left- right) . 
The two complementary ways of describing this order are both simple 
statements , neither has a passive form. A lack of correspondence 
between the form of a rel~tional statement and the extra- linguistic 
situation it describes can be corrected by transforming the relational 
statement to co- ordinate it with the subject ' s conceptual represent-
ation of the situation. This transformation of the relational term 
is not possible with statements describing one object acting on 
another v.ri thout distorting the meaning of the event described in 
the statement. 
In experiments using five and nine year old children as subjects 
Huttenlocher and Strauss (1968), Huttenlocher et al. (1968) investi-
gated the following hypotheses . 
A. Ones understanding of a statement depends upon the 
relation between that statement and t ::e extralinguistic 
situation it describes. Therefore comprehension is 
easiest when there is a correspondence between the per-
ceived actor and the logical subject of the experimenter's 
statement. 
B. The nature of the intellectual operations involved in 
co- ordinating the perceived actor with the logical subject 
will be different for relational statements than for state-
ments describing one object acting on another. 
The first of these experiments investigated Hypothesis A in terms 
of spatial relations. The subject ' s task was to place a mobile block 
(MB) above or below a fixed block (FB) in a ladder- l i ke structure with 
five shelves in order to make a pile. Two types of problems were 
used ; (1) when the subject of the experimenter 's statement was the 
mobile block and t~e object the fixed block. ' The MB is above/below 
the FB.' and (2) when the subject of the experimenter ' s statement was 
the fixed block and the object the mobile block. ' The FB is above/below 
the MB '. The results of this experiment showed that for all ages more 
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error s were made when the mobil e block was the object rather than the 
subject of the experimenter ' s statement . 
The second experiment in this series (Huttenlocher et al ., 1968) 
was analogous to the block task except that it involved statements 
that described one object acting on another . In this case materials 
used were toy trucks which were required to push/pull one another. 
The results showed that the phenomenon observed earlier with rela-
tional statements also holds when subject and object are linked by 
ordinary motion verbs like ' push ' and ' pull' . That is, it is 
easier to place an object described as grammatical subject than 
vice- versa. This was true for both active and passive sentences . 
A comparison of subjective accounts of the intellectual operations 
engaged in during these tasks suggested that these may differ according 
to the relational terms used . With spatial terms subjects transformed 
the experimenter ' s statement, where necessary, to make the mobile 
object its subject . With action statements , however , subjects 
co- ordinated the statement with the extralinguistic situation, when 
necessary, by imagining that the fixed object was in fact the mobile 
object . 
The major findings of Huttenlocher ' s experiments have been con-
firmed in a study by Olsen and Filby (1972) using adult subjects. When 
a perceptual event is coded in terms of the actor1active sentences are 
more easily verified than passive ones . The reverse is true when the 
event is coded in terms of the receiver of the action. Similar results 
were obtained in an earlier study by Tannenbaum and Williams (1968) . 
Carey (1964) and Wason (1965) have each suggested that a possible 
mechanism by which a particul ar statement may be harder or easier to 
understand is its plausibility within a given context . Wason found 
that the main factor influencing whether a negative statement is more 
difficul t to verify than a positive one is whether it is pl ausibl e 
within the context in which it is uttered . 
The theoreti cal views and experimental studies r eviewed in thi s 
section have each been concerned with some dimension of t he r elational 
aspect of l anguage comprehension and memory but do not , ei ther 
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individually or in combination, constitute an eX}llanatory model of the 
underlying processes involved. At best they offer descriptive data 
which suggests in outline some of the components which need to be 
taken into account in constituting such a model and indicate some 
directions in which further research could prove productive. Craik 
and Lockhart (1972) and Huttenlocher et al. (1968) have each emphasised 
the importance of perceptual events and their relation to the language 
structure and to the comprehension process in general . However as 
Trabasso (1973) points out we cannot, on t he basis of these or similar 
studies (e.g. Clark, Carpenter and Just, 1972), assimilate all concepts 
to percepts despite the fa ct that some primitive concepts seem to be 
derived from particular perceptual configurations (Michotte, 1963 ; 
Miller, 1972). Michotte's classic series of experiments demonstrated 
that definite combinations of objects in space and time were conducive 
to causal interpretations of events, while Miller has provided a comp-
rehensive analysis of verbs of motion showing how the meanings of a 
large body of lexical it ems could be expressed in terms of a small set 
of concepts and conceptual relationships. 
These studies provide some basis for a more differentiated con-
ceptual approach to this a rea. The work of Huttenlocher et al. (1968) 
in addition suggests, but by no means confirms , that different types of 
intellectual processes may be brought into play in r econciling linguistic 
descriptions with the extra-linguistic situations they portray depending 
on the type of relational concept employed in a particular study; 
descriptions of spatial relations between objects seem to be processed 
differently from statements describing one object acting on another . 
A further useful distinction is indicated by Jakobson's distinction 
between paradigmatic and syntagmatic relations . The clinical study of 
different types of aphasia (Jakobson and Hal l e, 1971; Luria, 1973) 
provides some evidence for a psychological reality to this distinction 
in addition to the semantic one . As Reid (1974) has stated, these two 
types of conceptual relationships can be shown to be related to the 
demands of different memory tasks . However with some exceptions 
(e . g . Bransford et al . 1972 ; Miller , 1972) there has been little 
direct investigation of syntagmatic relations in psychological 
studies to date . 
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The importance of context in rendering the described or 
perceived situation meaningful to the subject has been a pervasive 
theme in the work reviewed in this and previous sections . Wason's 
(1966) concept of ' plausibili ty ', the studies on inference generation 
(Bransford et al ., 1972 ; Barclay, 1973) and Cr aik ' s (1973) experi -
ments on depth of processing are examples which illustrate var ying 
aspects of the role of context in memory and comprehension processes . 
Task demands for recognition or recall of intrinsically meaningl ess 
material place a predominant emphasis on the external environmental 
context ; those which facilitate the generation of extrali nguistic 
inferences emphasise the internal environment or the subjec ts con-
viction of what is required to construct a meaningful internal 
representation of the situation or event . 
In the light of Barclay ' s comment , noted earlier, that the 
constructive approach to sentence meaning is but one manifestation 
of a mo r e general process of knowledge acquisition, the following 
section will be concerned with a brief review of studies concerned 
with the process of abstr acting conceptual schema from visual and 
pictorial information. The relational and contextual aspects of this 
process will be of particular concern. 
Schema Formation: Abstraction from Visual and Pictor ial Material 
Posner (1969) on the basis of findings from a number of experiments 
using visual patterns as stimulus materials (Evans , 1967b ; Posner and 
Konik, 1966 ; Posner, Goldsmith, and Wil ton, 1967; Posner and Keele , 
1968, 1969) . has concluded that r etention of previously perceived 
events is not as vivid or complete as t he original perception, The 
two main explanations he proposes for this conclusion are , (a) that 
selective attention l eads t o the storage of some aspects of a scene 
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rather than others, and (b) that stimuli as originally processed may 
lose specificity as more general classifications are achieved . These 
principl es are in general outline consistent with those found to 
operate in similar research using prose passages or groups of 
sentences (Barclay, 1973 ; Sachs, 1967) . 
Most studies of schema formation have used some form of random 
visual patterns . The basic pattern is called the prototype . A 
number of transformations of the prototype are constructed varying 
in degree of distortion from the original pattern. The prototype 
thus represents the central tendency or communalities among the derived 
patterns and constitutes the ' schema ' . A number of studies have shown 
that in classification tasks subjects are able to separate patterns 
derived from one cent ral t endency or prototype from those derived from 
another without prior instruction and without receiving knowledge of 
results (Evans , 1967b). 
Posner ( 1969) has suggested, however, that the ability of human 
subjects to learn to identify patterns that are instances of different 
central tendencies is not in itself sufficient evidence that this type 
of classification involves the abstraction of a schema . A series of 
experiments was designed to investigate t his question (Posner and 
Keele , 1968, 1969) . Materials used in these studies were pat terns 
of nine dots printed on separate cards . Subjects learned to associate 
four different distortions from each of a number of prototypes with one 
another by a paired- associate technique . Subjects were then presented 
with a list of patterns and asked to classify them in terms of which 
patterns belonged together . The list consisted of (1) the prototypes 
which they had not seen before ; (2) old distortions which they had just 
finished learning and (3) control patterns which were within the learned 
category. Some of the control patterns were designed to have the same 
degree of distance from the four learned patterns as did the prototype 
but were not themselves the prototype . The r esul ts of this experiment 
showed that the prototypes were correctly classified significantly more 
often than any of the control patterns . Posner interprets these results 
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as an indication that the process of classifying patterns does not 
rely solely upon the distance relationship from a particular stored 
exemplar, but rather on the distance of the new pattern from those 
aspects of the stored pattern that represents qualities common to 
all the exemplars . This view is consistent with that of Garner 
(1966) who proposed that one's knowledge is a function of the 
perception of properties of sets of stimuli rather than of the 
properties of individual stimuli . 
To observe what happens to the process of schema formation over 
time Posner and Keele (1969) replicated their 1968 experiment with 
the addition of a control group who experienced one week ' s delay between 
learning the original patterns and being exposed to the classification 
task. Resul ts from this experiment indicated that after one week ' s 
delay the schema or prototype was recognized at least as well as the 
particular patterns the subjects had learned . The time delay 
increased the number of classification errors made for the memori sed 
patterns in comparison with the number of errors made for these patterns 
under the no delay conditions . The number of errors made in classify-
ing the schema or prototype patterns did , however, show a definite 
decrease after one week ' s delay from the error level recorded under 
the no delay condition. Posner contends that it is reasonable to 
interpret these results as evidence that the abstraction of information 
concerning the central tendency takes place during learning rather than 
being later mediated through individual stored patterns . 
Franks and Bransford (1971) extended the work on schema abstraction 
from visual patterns as developed by Posner and Keele (1968 , 1969) on 
the basis of their view that the nature of the stimulus materials used in 
these experiments (configurations of dots) limited the possibility of a 
structural specification of the nature and genesis of the schema 
derived. Franks and Bransford constructed a series of structured 
spatial configurations of well- defined forms (triangles , squares and 
other geometric shapes), constituting a number of prototypes and from 
these generated a set of transformations constrained by a set of discrete 
deterministic rules . In a series of four experiments utilizing an 
acquisition- recognition paradigm subjects were exposed to items which 
were instances of patterns that varied in transformational distance 
from the prototype . In a subsequent recognition test subjects were 
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given a set of items consisting of (a) the prototypes which they had 
not previously seen and (b) transformations from the prototype which 
varied in transformational distance from it. Results from these 
experiments showed that in all instances the prototype received the 
highest recognition rating despite the fact that it had not been 
previously seen by subjects. For all other items subject's 
recognition ratings were found to be inversely related to the proto-
type . Franks and Bransford consider that their results support a 
schema plus transformations model of memory representation for 
patterned visual materials . According to this view the schema 
reflects the interrelationships among the acquisition configurations 
and the communalities abstracted from these. These conclusions are 
in substantial agreement with those expressed by Posner in summing 
up his earlier experiments on schema formation (Posner and Keele, 
1969) . 
Evans (1967a) has defined schema t heory as referring to a population 
of objects all of which can be efficiently described by t he same schema 
rules. A schema rule is abstracted as a set of commonly occurring 
charact e ristics in a collection of otherwise different instances. The 
prototype experiments outlined above are in conformity with this 
definition. However Evans considers that, "Schema theory, as 
described above, 
'is clearly inadequate to deal with ordinary human 
perception. The environment does not, in general, 
provide a collection of stimuli belonging to the same 
schema family. Instead instances of various schema 
families are normally mixed together (1967a, p . 87) . " 
Evans proposes that the mixed schema condition requires that schema 
theory be extended beyond an investigation of how people remember patterns 
to the area of concept formation and concept utilization. It is at this 
point that schema theory extension can be seen to merge into the con-
structive approach to meaning that has been the central focus of this 
review. 
Work on the abstraction of schema from visual patterns has been 
almost solely concerned with the relation of similarity or the 
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paradigmatic pole of the paradigmatic-syntagmatic distinction in the 
construction of conceptual r epresentations. To date there has been 
virtually no experimental work in this area to parallel the 
investigations of the syntagmatic pole of this distinction as there 
has been in studies utilizing verbal materials. 
One reason for this could be based on a finding by Shepard 
(1967) that surface recognition memory for pictures is strong and 
of long duration. Shepard investigated recognition memory f or 
groups of approximately 600 stimuli consisting of either words, 
sentences or pictures . Correct recognition responses for these 
groups of approximately 600 stimuli consisting of either words, 
sentences or pictures. Correct recognition r esponses for these 
groups of stimuli were respectively 9Cf/o, 88% and 98</o under no delay 
conditions . Even after one week's delay recognition memory for 
pictures remained as hi gh as 9Cf/o. From this it could be concluded 
that subjects would be very unlikely, in studies using pictorial 
materials, to confuse implicit information or meaningful inferences 
with explicit information as has been shown to occur in studies 
using linguistic materials (Barclay, 1973; Bransford et al., 1972). 
However the point is often overlooked that Shepard obtained a very 
high recognition response also for words and sentences (9o% and 88% 
respectively) although responses for these stimuli did not reach the 
level obtained for pictures . A possible explanation for the strong 
surface or verbatim memory illustrated by these results could be 
that in Shepard ' s study the three types of stimuli were presented as 
a series of discrete entities . As noted previously the generation 
of inferences, which constitutes one source of confusion in recognition 
tasks, seems to depend on the prior organization of stimulus information 
in a way that outlines some overall description of an object or a 
situation (e . g. Rosenberg and Jarvella , 1970). 
A recent study by Baggett (1975) used an acquisition recognition 
paradigm to investigate the nature of memory representations for two 
types of picture stories; surface information arising from pictures 
which occurred in the stories and conceptual information inferrable 
when integrating the pictures into a connected story but not originally 
explicitly presented in the stories. Materials used in this experiment 
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were stories consisting of four pictures which outlines a simple but 
coherent series of events. The target picture in each story 
sequence consisted of two versions, one explicitly portraying an 
event in the sequence while the other required that inferences be 
generated about the occurrence of this event from the context and sequence 
of other pictures in the story. Subjects in the acquisition phase 
of the experiment saw versions of the story sequence which contained 
either the explicit or the implicit target picture. The recognition 
task was to i dent ify whether the explicit target picture was an event 
in the original story sequence. Baggett proposed two hypotheses. 
The first of t hese was that with no delay between acquisition and 
recognition reaction times for recognition would be faster in those 
cases where the explicit target picture was included in the original 
story sequence the subject viewed, In those cases where the event 
portrayed by the target picture had to be inferred as occurring in 
t he sequence, r eaction times for recognition were expected to be 
slower. The second hypothesis was that with a 72 hour delay between 
acquisition and recognit ion the differences in reaction time between 
the two groups of subjects in recognizing the target picture should 
markedly decrease. However it was not expected that the difference 
would entirely disappear in the light of Shepard's (1967) finding that 
surface memory for pictures is vivid and of long duration . 
Results from this experiment confirmed both of the hypotheses. 
A very much slower reaction time for recognition of the target picture 
was recorded for subjects who had originally seen the story sequence 
containing the implicit target picture than for those who viewed the 
story sequence containing the explicit picture. However after a 72 
hour delay the differences in recognition reaction time between the 
two groups of subjects were found to differ only very slightly. 
Baggett interprets these results as an indication that the 
surface memory trace which aided faster access to recognition of 
explicitly descriptive pictures under the no delay condition was no 
longer available after 72 hours; the essential representation 
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remaining in memory at this point is likely to be a conceptual and 
probabl y not a pictorial one . 
In an extension to this experiment Baggett investigated the role 
of instructions on surface memory for pictures . When explicit 
instructions were given to subjects to memorize only the precise 
individual pictures seen it was found that even after 72 hours 
subjects made no false recognition responses at all and reaction 
times were short . It seems that surface memory for pictures is 
strong and of long duration under the following conditions ; (a) if 
task demands require this and (b) if pictures are regarded as 
discrete visual entities rather than as surface cues to an underlying 
meaningful description of a situation. 
Baggett included one further experiment in this study . T~is 
was designed to test the hypothesis that reaction time differences 
would disappear if subjects , after viewing either the explicit or 
the implicit versions of stories , were asked to respond either 'yes ' 
or ' no ' to written questions describing the target event in the 
story sequence . The rationale given by Baggett for this hypothesis 
was that subjects who were actually shown the explicit version of the 
story would have to infer the answers to the verbal questions in much 
the same way as would subjects who originally saw only the implicit 
version ; this would be so because a direct surface match would not 
be possible because two modalities, verbal and pictorial were involved. 
The results of this experiment confirmed the hypothesis . Reaction time 
differences between the explicit and implicit conditions which operated 
in the first experiment in this series were virtually eliminated . In 
fact a very slight reaction time advantage was recorded for those 
subjects who had earlier viewed the implicit version of the story . 
Baggett interprets these results as an indication that subjects , 
regardl ess of whether they had viewed the expli c i t or the implicit 
story version, were responding from the same basic conceptual represent-
ation of the situation. She suggests that this finding gives some 
empirical support to Pylyshyn' s (1973) contention that conceptual 
memory for pictures is basical ly propositional or descripti ve in nature . 
Pylshyn ' s concept of propositional knowledge is derived from the 
seminal work of Frege (1879/1960) and is based on the notion that 
the proposition is a description, an assertion or a meaning which 
can be conveyed by a number of different symbolic forms but is 
itself not logically dependent on any particular one of them. 
Experimental work by Carpenter and Just (1975) and Clark and Chase 
(1972) has also given support to Pylshyn ' s theoretical position. 
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In summing up their 1975 series of experiments Carpenter and Just 
stated that their findings give support to the view that (a) sentences 
are internally represented as an ordered set of constituents in an 
abstract propositional format; (b) other information sources (such 
as pictures) are also r epresented in similar format . 
The experiments reviewed in this section give some support to 
the view that the processes involved in constructing conceptual 
representations from visual and pictorial material are, in general , 
very similar to the processes found to operate when the stimulus 
information is presented in linguistic form . The constraints which 
affect the types of memory representations formed are also similar . 
For example, task demands t o some extent determine whether the 
predominant emphasis will be on the retention of surface form in 
contrast to a more conceptual representation . However the work of 
Baggett (1975) and Posner and Keele (1968 , 1969) has indicated that 
this distinction becomes less clear- cut over t ime . As was illustrated 
in verbal studies (e . g . Barclay, 1973 ; Rosenberg and Jarvella, 1970) 
the subject ' s awareness of the presence of an overall event in tasks 
involving pictorial stimul i seems to facilitate t he generation of 
inferences which can be one source of recognition errors . Contrasting 
the results obtained by Baggett (1975) with those of Shepard (1967) 
gives tentative support to this view. However both of these studies 
also suggest that a difference , but one of degree rather than of kind, 
seems to obtain between memory for pictorial material and that for 
verbal material ; that is , a subject ' s surface memory for actually 
viewed pictures, although sensitive to experimental conditions and 
task demands , tends to remain accurate and extant for a l onger time 
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duration than does verbatim memory for verbal material (Keenan, 
Kintsch and McKoon, 1974) . 
This factor could be expected to influence , to an as yet 
undetermined degree , some differences in responses in memory 
research involving the abstraction of meaning from visual or 
pictorial materials i n contrast to the responses given when 
the stimul us materials are linguistic in form . 
